

## Towards a new leader of local water policy in France?

A. Grandgirard

*Unité Mixte de Recherche Cemagref-ENGEEES (Ecole Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg) en Gestion des services publics, Strasbourg, France.*

*Doctorante au Centre de gestion Scientifique, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, France.*

**Abstract:** The administrative organisation of water management in France is very complex: the lack of territorial coherence in public interventions is obvious. There is no satisfactory regulation in this field. The law (about local responsibilities, not only focalised on water policy) of March 1995 introduced the concept of “chef de file” (leader) in order to clarify both the role and responsibilities of each actor and his fields of intervention. On the one hand the concept of “chef de file” is an alternative to the tangle of competencies between actors, which harms the effectiveness of water policy. On the other hand the concept of “chef de file” deals with the need for a referee in charge of animation, coordination and decision-making if necessary. The concept of “chef de file” seems appropriate for tackling the problems of competent distribution and unravelling the tangles of the actors frequently observed in the field of water management. However, the legislator has hardly recognised this concept. The actors concerned do not agree on the significance and even the relevance of this concept. Some of them fear that its implementation will be in conflict with the principle of free administration of the communities (“libre administration des collectivités”). And even when they consider that it is relevant, they agree neither on the attributions related to this role nor on the best actor for the job. Our purpose is to describe the actors’ relationships by this exploratory study. We have based our thoughts on interviews of various actors involved in water management and on the analysis of the legal debate in the area of sharing competencies. We have been interested by the question of the legitimacy of actors to become “chef de file”. We could identify four types of “chef de file” by crossing the two following dimensions: the degree of specialisation of the actor (transversal practitioner vs. specialist) and the entrance point in water policy/ the base of legitimacy (installations – equipment vs. sustainable management of resources). In conclusion we will point out advantages and drawbacks of each identified type of “chef de file”. Firstly we will introduce the context of French water management as well as the legal framework of the concept of “chef de file”. Then we will present a rapid synthesis of the opinions of various actors in connection with this concept. To conclude, we will point out the interests and limits of this type of strategy.

**Key words:** sustainable management, water policy, water management, leader, communities, France, organization, municipalities, inter-municipal bodies, department, region

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The approach to questions related to water in France is complex. On the one hand, a large number of actors - the authorities, communities and local councillors, economic actors, associations - are involved in the water policy. On the other hand, the water management takes place on a multiplicity of geographical scales. These scales are based on general institutional divisions: the European framework (with the directives), the national framework, the six large basins slopes, 22 Regions, 96 Departments and 36 772 municipalities, but also on a number of sub-basins, slopes and inter-municipalities. In the following of this presentation, we have chosen to call “communities” all municipalities and inter-municipal bodies. To give an order of magnitude, in 1998 the French Institute of Environment (IFEN) enumerated 16000 water supply services and 18000 sewage services. To have a vision of this question on an European point of view, the reader can refer to the presentations of Guérin-Schneider, Nakhla and Grand d'Esnon (2002) or Barraqué (1995; 2003). The purpose of this presentation is to analyze the current organisation and to discuss about a new leadership (the “chef de file”) and its eventual interest to cope with problems in current water management.

## 2. THE CONTEXT OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN FRANCE

In this part, we describe the organization of the water policy briefly and in a simple way. We will propose hereafter a very simplified presentation but we hope it will make it possible to the reader to compare each group of actors and to specify their respective responsibilities. Then we will pick out what seems to be the main deficiencies and problems of this kind of organization.

### 2.1 Institutional framework, actors and responsibilities

#### 2.1.1 Legal framework

In 1964, the Water Act established a water regime and distribution plan and launched the anti-pollution movement. The principle of water management in its natural milieu was instituted by this outline law and its application decrees. It divided France's territory into 6 major hydrographic basins, each with an "Agence Financière de Bassin" (Financial Basin Agency), later renamed "Agence de l'Eau" (water agency). Water agencies were created as executive organs for managing water resources. A natural division based on hydrographic basins was chosen as territory for each agency.

Then, European directives on drinking water and waste water treatment increased the demand for water quality and treatment and were subsequently incorporated into French law in 1992. Since the law of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 1992, water is considered as a "national common heritage". Its protection and development as a usable resource is in the public interest. There are four basic principles, which lead the current water policy:

- An integrated approach, which considers simultaneously water use requirements and respect of aquatic ecosystems, surface and groundwater in quantity and quality.
- The hydrographic basin: a territory adapted for the management of water as "water knows no administrative boundary".
- The participation and cooperation of various types of water users. This cooperation can be possible principally through Masterplans for Water Development and Management (Schéma Directeur d'aménagement et de gestion des eaux SDAGE) and Local Water Development and Management Plans (Schémas d'aménagement et de gestion des eaux SAGE), which have to establish partnerships and to coordinate the actions of Public Authorities and developers.
- Economic incentive tools. The Water Agencies have to mobilize specific financial resources in application of the "polluter pays" principle.

On 23 October 2000, the European Union Water Framework Directive (or shorter the WFD) was adopted. One of the innovations of the WFD is that it provides a framework for integrated management of groundwater and surface water for the first time at European level. These are the key aims of the Directive (incorporated into French law the 21st of April 2004):

- expanding the scope of water protection to all waters, surface waters and groundwater
- achieving "good status" for all waters by a set deadline
- water management based on river basins
- "combined approach" of emission limit values and quality standards
- establishing correct pricing
- involving individual citizens more closely
- streamlining legislation

### 2.1.2 Two visions of the current organization in practice

Within this framework, water policy must be elaborated with respect of the competence of each private or public contracting authority in its specific sphere.

#### A top-down vision

To make it simple, we can say that water policy is defined by the State, in partnership with local Communities and users. There are three levels at which dialogue and cooperation are institutionalized:

- at a national level, representatives of the Parliament, the Senate, different institutions and federations are regrouped in the National Water Committee. This Committee is consulted on the trend of the national water policy and on the elaboration of the law.
- at the level of each river basin, the River Basin Committee (also named “Water parliament”) is composed of representatives from Regions, Departments and Communities and representatives of State Administration, users and water specialists. It elaborates and adopts the Masterplans for Water Development and Management (SDAGE) which fix the trends for a balanced, quantitative and qualitative water management. It is consulted by the Water Agency on the charges, the rates and ratio<sup>1</sup> which will be applied in the basin.
- at the level of an hydrographic unit, the local Water Commission is composed of one half representatives of local communities, of one quarter representatives of users and of one quarter State representatives. It is in charge of the elaboration of the Local Water Development and Management Plan (SAGE). The SAGE fixes the general objectives for the utilization, development and protection, in a quantitative and qualitative way, of surface and groundwater resources, and aquatic ecosystems, as well for the preservation of wetlands, in a manner which complies with the principles defined by law. When the scheme has been approved, all administrative authorities’ decisions must be consistent with this scheme.

#### A bottom-up vision

In our presentation, we have chosen to focus on local water policy, which is why we will now present its context and organization in greater detail. Figure 1 shows a simplified analysis of this local organization for drinking water and sanitation.

This figure has been simplified so as to represent only those actors involved in drinking water and sanitation and not in the whole water cycle. The basic organization of the water services is based on a tripartite relation between the community, the users and the supplier. The local community is the organizing authority of the service. The supplier can be public or private, but, even in a case of delegation to a private supplier, the community keeps the responsibility for the service. The supplier is related to the users via a contract of subscription. The users are at the same time at the origin and the end of the chain: in the beginning because they elect their representatives (who are responsible for the choice of organization of the service) and at the end because the users benefit from the service and they are associated there through a certain number of documents and structures (like advisory commissions for example). A departmental State administration, a private engineering or a design department can intervene in this tripartite relation, at the request of the communities, in order to exert a mission of assistance and counsel for the community. This figure corresponds to a particular situation because it represents a case without this mission of assistance.

Figure 2 shows the composition of the local Water Commission we have mentioned before ( $\frac{1}{2}$  local communities representatives,  $\frac{1}{4}$  State representatives,  $\frac{1}{4}$  users representatives).

This local organization can be altogether more complex because communities are often members of inter-communities. Moreover the design of inter-communities can be different for drinking water and for sanitation or even for drinking water supply and drinking water pumping and treatment! We

<sup>1</sup> We mean the charges, the rates and ratio concerning conditions to become a subsidy from Water Agencies. For example, it could be a ratio of the water price in this community by the average price in the department, and this ratio could determine rate of subsidy for a project of sanitation of the community.

may think that such an organization creates some problems. We will list some of them in the next part of the article.




Figure 1. Simplified scheme of the local organization of water supply and sanitation.




Figure 2. Composition of the local Water Commission.

## 2.2 Deficiencies of the current organization

Tackling problems of management of a common good is difficult, as Ostrom (1990) says that neither the state nor the market seem to be perfect: “*What one can observe in the world, however, is that neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems*” (p.1). That is why, for water, different forms of organization have to be set up in order to respond to challenges of sustainable development. The

organization of French water management encounters some difficulties to exploit all the opportunities and to solve all the problems in this field. We will now list some of those deficiencies of this organization.

On the one hand, some voices start to criticise the adequacy of the concept of catchment area on which the French organization is based. In fact, some may think that it is important to make the distinction between two territories: the territory of reflection and coherency and the territory of action, as pointed out by Antoine and Roux (2004) and Laganier and Scarwell (2001). For Laganier and Scarwell (2001), political stakes on the basin scale are necessary in order to make this territory become the territory of reference for collective action. Others (Barreteau, Cernesson, Garin and Belaud (2004)) conclude their studies by the fact that no territory (even the catchment area) permanently represents the adapted territory for the water management in an hydrographic basin. They propose the creation of institutions at the adapted scale for each identified stake. In a similar way, Hervochon, Sauvageot Guibert, Martel and Brounais (2004) note that, in spite of its technical adequacy, the catchment area cannot be the adapted territory for management because of its disconnection from political logic in the catchment area and in the territory just behind. Therefore it is necessary to elaborate a more global view because political, social, technical (the network's interconnections, fluvial connections, ...) and economic exchanges exist between territories. Some suggest to enlarge the classical territory of SAGE. For Ghiotti (2004, p.5), "*Beside THE water territory, water territorIES are (re?)emerging or forming, not always linked with natural and environmental approach, but more jointed with inter-communal, departmental or regional logics coming out of the decentralization process*". He thinks that competition exists between communities for controlling a territory in order to improve their legitimacy and their existence. That struggle enforces the dilution of local public action.

This remark leads us to a second deficiency in public local action: the lack of coordination. The need for coordination appears in multiple fields:

- On technical and environmental aspects. For example, in the case of a common good, it is necessary to coordinate the action of all the actors because all changes made to one place could have consequences for other places. For example, you cannot prevent flooding in one place, without considering the effects everywhere else along the river.
- On financial aspects. Communities do not always have adequate funds to finance or to renew their networks or installations. Solutions exist (regrouping of communities, mutualisation of the equipment, delegation to a private supplier, cross financing, etc.). But sometimes these solutions reach their limits: opportunism of the supplier, dispersion of the subsidies, frequent evolution of the legislation, etc. More coordination seems to be necessary in order to respond to all these difficulties.
- For limiting externalities which could be numerous. For example, when you clean up water, you produce smells and sludge. People who are not responsible for these products may have to deal with the problem they generate. In order to tackle with these externalities, coordination could be a solution.
- For solving the tangle of competencies. Another problem is the opacity of the sharing of competencies. Nowadays, the competencies of each actor are defined by the law but are often quite divided. Moreover, actors can take some competencies voluntarily, which augments the complexity of the system. A circular of the Ministry of Interior, quoted in the bulletin 213 of the FNCCR<sup>2</sup>, reveals anomalies : a definition of competencies that is too general (which implies a low concernment of all actors), an imprecise definition of common interest (limited to a list of equipment !), approximation of the transfer of competencies really implemented in practice, obsolescence of status of existing inter-municipal bodies, ... We can find the same conclusions in the report of the Cour des Comptes for the year 2000. This report identifies cases of communities where competencies were transferred in theory but not exerted in reality. The same problem is also identified by Regourd (2004) who regrets the administrative opacity and the superposition of territories.

<sup>2</sup> Fédération Nationale des Collectivités Concédantes et des Régies which means association of local communities which are responsible for networks public services like electricity, water and gas

- For introducing more transparency. The multiplicity of actors and the division and tangle of competencies handicap a good management of the water sector but also represents a problem for the transparency of the sector. Users cannot really understand how things happen and they campaign for the introduction of more democracy in the system. Moreover, this lack of transparency accentuates the deficiency of the control of legality. According to Regourd (2004), the deficiency of this system does not always bother representatives of communities who are often also representatives at a national level via the plurality of mandate and who can take benefit of this lack of legislation in some of their actions and decisions.
- Problems of lack of regulation. No one among the actors has clearly got the mandate to regulate this field and no regulation can take place alone. Consequently, in the case of one of the actor become clearly the role of regulator, the system could be improved.

As we have presented in this part, the organization of French Water management is complex and sometimes inappropriate. As it is emphasized in the report by Dubois (2001), *“There is no strictly water resource management today in France, but an ensemble of actions convergent to this management, in a more or less coherent and efficient way.”* (p.89). Launay (2003) pointed also out the need of more coordination (p.35). However some strategies may help to improve this management. In this presentation, we have chosen to focus on one of these strategies which can provide response to some problems that we identified previously: the “chef de file”, whose role consists in a new form of leadership between communities.

### **3. THE CONCEPT OF “CHEF DE FILE”: AN ALTERNATIVE TO IMPROVE FRENCH LOCAL WATER POLICY?**

As we have pointed it out, there is no satisfactory regulation in the field of water management. The law (about local responsibilities, not only focalised on water policy) of March 1995 introduced the concept of "chef de file" (leader) in order to clarify, both the role and responsibilities of each actor and his areas of intervention. First, we will present the legal framework of this concept and bring out interests of this concept. Then, we will set out the positions of different actors interviewed and compare these to the concept of “chef de file”.

#### ***3.1 Legal framework and interest of this concept***

As the State does not manage to make coherent blocks of competencies, other answers have to be devised in order to ensure the conformity of the actions of all participants to border partnerships. When the legislator introduced this concept, he wanted to set up local collective action. First, we will give a rapid historical overview of the concept and the critics of it, then we will present the interest of this concept.

##### ***3.1.1 An emerging concept but confronting difficulties***

The expression “chef de file” was used by the legislator for the first time in the law about “orientation and planning of territories” from the 4<sup>th</sup> of February 1995. Actually, in this law, there was an article allowing the possibility for communities to institute a “chef de file”. This article was rejected by the Constitutional Council some time after its initial appearance because the conditions for exercising this role had not been defined by the law. Since that attempt, we can no longer find this concept in law.

However, in 2002, the government reintroduced implicitly the concept of “chef de file”, in the rewriting of the constitution. In fact, the proposition tended to assign the responsibility for collective action to a community designed by the law. Although this project can be seen as an

acknowledgment of this concept, it is merely a prudent progression with a concept difficult to manage. This concept effectively creates a contradiction with the principle of free administration of communities (“principe de libre administration des collectivités”). Furthermore, in the French law, there is now also written that there cannot be supervision of one community by another. Consequently we can say that there is only a very little space for the concept to be implemented in practice.

The implementation of the concept of “chef de file” raises also other questions:

- What kind of fields need “chef de file”?
- How can this innovation be implemented?
- Should the law design explicitly a “chef de file” or should the designation be contingent to the local context and to the choice of communities?
- What kind of criteria are necessary for the legitimacy of a community to become a “chef de file”?

### *3.1.2 Potential accuracy of this concept for French local water policy*

At this state of the presentation, we may think that all the difficulties presented before should lead to the giving up of it. But the concept of “chef de file” is relevant and deserves to be developed.

On the one hand the concept of “chef de file” can be an alternative to the tangles of competencies between actors, which harms the effectiveness of water policy. In fact, French local policy needs juridical responses to local complex phenomenon. According to Fonrojet (2004), the designation of “chef de file” promotes coherency of politics in fields where competencies are divided. The concept of “chef de file” could solve, at least partially, problems of cross financing and problems of confused and inextricable repartition of competencies between a number of actors always increasing. According to Regourd (2004), the concept of “chef de file” could also be a way to solve the dilution of responsibilities between communities which penalizes the users.

On the other hand the concept of “chef de file” deals with the need for a referee, in charge of animation, coordination and decision if necessary. As we have shown in our first part of the presentation, coordination is needed between communities, on technical and environmental aspects but on social, political and economical aspects too. This coordination is necessary but not sufficient in some cases because sometimes when actors disagree, they can be blocked in a dead-end. To resolve this situation, it could be useful for one of the actors to have the possibility to decide and play the role of a referee.

These reasons encourage us to think that the concept of “chef de file” represents a new form of leadership which could be useful in French local water policy. But what do the actors think about this concept and its relevancy in French local water policy? That is the question we will explore in the next part of the article.

### *3.2 Who are the potential “chef de file”?*

This part of the article is based on a study realised for the French Ministry of Environment by Grandgirard et al. (2004). We have actually made an exploratory study about this concept and the reaction it evokes from various actors. We have also analysed the debate about the insertion of this concept in the law and we have made some interviews with local actors. The question that interested us was that of the legitimacy of an actor to become a “chef de file” because we think that it is a central question which will determine the acceptation of the implementation of this concept by actors or its rejection. We will present the different positions of actors interviewed about this concept. We just want to specify that the study did not take place on the whole French territory, so the results have to be considered only like a partial vision of specific actors.

### 3.2.1 *The point of view of the region Bretagne and Alsace*

These two regions argue that the concept of “chef de file” is necessary to solve problems of tangles of competencies and to improve local water management<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore they claim to be “chef de file” in the area of water. Actually, they point out the fact that they are responsible for the water resource policy and that the central place of this question gives them legitimacy to become “chef de file” for water in their respective region.

### 3.2.2 *The point of view of Departments*

A large majority of Departments (93%) consider that Departments hold a real legitimacy to become “chef de file” of drinking water and sanitation politics<sup>4</sup>. They propose to become responsible for a departmental water management scheme, a document which will orientate and plan public action by fixing quantitative and qualitative objectives on removal and discharges of water, on flow management, in coherence with the SDAGE. They demand to be “chef de file” for these fields as they are now responsible for waste management (see box hereafter about the role of the Department in French local waste policy). Their legitimacy seems to be based on their proximity of communities, on their quite important financial participation for the equipment and on the widespread scope of their intervention (on the whole cycle of water).

#### The role of the Department in French local waste policy

In the area of waste management, actors are organised in a different way than in the area of water management. In fact, the law is clearer on waste policy than on water policy. Effectively, the law of the 13th of July 1992 established the obligation to elaborate a plan about the removal of household waste in each departmental area. Since the law about local responsibilities of October 2004, the responsibility of this planning is clearly attributed to Departmental Councils. The plan:

- fixes actions to prevent the rise in production of household waste and to control costs ;
- establishes a prospective inventory for 5 or 10 years of the quantity of waste to remove by nature and origin ;
- fixes objectives of valorisation - incineration – burying and collect of half of the production of waste for material and organic recycling ;
- makes a list of installations of waste removal in use and which it will be necessary to create.

When the plan is adopted, all the decisions of administration have to be compatible with it. We can see this disposal like an application of the “chef de file” concept.

### 3.2.3 *The point of view of EPTB*

The EPTB (Etablissements Publics Territoriaux de Bassin, could be translated by public basin territorial establishments) are mixed syndicates or interdepartmental institutions, who are in charged of flood prevention, balanced management of water resources and preservation and management of wetlands on a basin or sub-basin scale. They are heterogeneous by their level of action, by their field and by their size. Some of them are only responsible for planning while others are responsible for technical aspects of duties. Their legitimacy is based on the coherence of their territory of intervention which is based on a coherent hydro-geographic scale<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, they are potential

<sup>3</sup> See for example an interview of the president of the Region Bretagne in *Région Magazine* (n°63, 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 2003) or a note of the Region Alsace of December 2002 for the “Assises régionales des libertés locales” entitled « Une vraie Région pour une France forte et moderne : Décentralisation, les propositions de la Région Alsace ».

<sup>4</sup> Cf a survey of 2003 from the Assemblée des Départements de France

<sup>5</sup> As pointed by Michel Allanic, director of one EPTB (Institution d’Aménagement de la Vilaine) during his intervention on the seminar ENGEES the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January 2003

“chef de file” because of their recognized expertise on struggle versus flooding. Their legitimacy for becoming “chef de file” is based on their specialisation on water and on their coherent geographical scale.

### 3.2.4 *The point of view of other actors*

Contrary to the three categories of actors we just mentioned, the other actors have not claimed to be “chef de file”. Some of them do not want to comment about this concept. Others wait to see what this concept will bring to the local management and others (communes in particular) dread its implementation because they fear for their freedom of choice. After this rapid outline of positions of various actors, we may conclude that this concept does not enjoy the unanimity of the actors. They are quite divided about its adequacy. And even though they find it relevant, they disagree about whom is the adequate actor to fulfil this function.

## 4. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES

Although actors disagree about this concept we think that the introduction of a “chef de file” in French Water Policy could be a solution. We thus could identify four types of “chef de file”, by crossing the two following dimensions:

- the degrees of specialisation of the actor (transversal / specialist). By specialist, we means that the actor is focused on water or sometimes even on a specific part of the water cycle like flooding for example, which means that this type of actor has a thorough knowledge of its competency’s field. By transversal, we means that this actor has got competencies in other fields like economical development, land planning, transport, etc. which allows him a more larger view of problems ;
- the entrance point in water policy or the key object of legitimacy for this actor to become “chef de file” (planning – equipments / sustainable management of the resource).

On Figure 3, you could use these four types of potential “chef de file”. We have positioned Water Agencies as potential “chef de file” even though they don’t claim to assume this role because some of others actors want them for “chef de file” due to their coherent geographical scale and their global view of the resource. Each type of “chef de file” has advantages and drawbacks for assuming this responsibility. We have listed and summarised this in Table 1.

Another thing we may remark is that competition between potential candidates takes place for control of two management tools:

- Observatories (able to centralise all data)
- Planning

These management tools seem to play a central role in piloting the action of a potential “chef de file”.

After this rapid overview of the concept of “chef de file” and its relevancy into the local water policy in France, we can say that, even though the implementation of a “chef de file” can improve water management by introducing more coordination and by solving the problem of the need of a referee, this concept will not be introduced in French local water policy for a while. In fact, too much resistance of some actors and too much struggle between potential candidates seem to prevent the implementation of a “chef de file” in French local water policy. But perhaps politicians will take us by surprise?




Figure 3. Four types of “chef de file”

Table 1. Advantages and drawbacks of potential “chef de file”

	Advantages	Drawbacks
Department	Coherent political scale Proximity of the local actors Current commitment in equipment and planning Coherency possible with other policy (land planning, social policy, ...)	Risk of establishing a hierarchy between local communities
EPTB	Coherent hydrographical scale Proximity of the local actors Current commitment in equipment and planning	No integration of political dynamics in actions Focused on water only, or even on a part of the whole water cycle
Region	Coherent political scale Planning Coherency possible with other policy (economical development, transport, ...)	Risk of establishing a hierarchy between local communities Sometimes far from local actors
Water Agency	Coherent hydrographical scale Global view of the resource No political pressure	No implication in local politics and no envy to be involved Far from local actors

## REFERENCES

- Antoine, J. and A.-L. Roux (2004). Eau et territoires : vers une gestion intégrée. Journée d'études : les territoires de l'eau, Université d'Artois, Arras.
- Barraqué, B. (1995). "Les politiques de l'eau en Europe." Revue de Science Politique vol.45(n°3): pp. 420-453.
- Barraqué, B. (2003). Les services publics d'eau en France et en Europe. In Données urbaines 4. D. Pumain and M.-F. Mattei (coord.). Paris, Editions Anthropos, INSEE: pp. 387-399.
- Barreteau, O., F. Cernesson, et al. (2004). Quels niveaux d'organisation pour la gestion des tensions sur l'eau ? Etudes de cas dans le Sud de la France. Journée d'études : les territoires de l'eau, Université d'Artois, Arras.
- Dubois, D. (2001). Mission d'étude et de réflexion sur l'organisation des pouvoirs publics dans le domaine de la protection de l'environnement. Paris, Premier Ministre: 116 p.
- Fonrojet, S. (2004). L'organisation territoriale : quelle répartition des compétences ? Les Cahiers Français. Décentralisation, Etat et territoires: pp.22-26.
- Ghiotti, S. (2004). Les territoires de l'eau et la décentralisation. La gouvernance de bassin versant ou les limites d'une évidence. Journée d'études : les territoires de l'eau, Université d'Artois, Arras.

- Grandgirard, A., F. Norvez, et al. (2004). Un chef de file pour la politique de l'eau ? Paris, Ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable: 24 p.
- Guérin-Schneider, L., M. Nakhla, et al. (2002). "Gestion et organisation des services publics d'eau en Europe." Cahier de Recherche du Centre de Gestion Scientifique de l'Ecole des Mines de Paris(n° 19): 51 p.
- Hervochon, F., A. Sauvageot Guibert, et al. (2004). D'une logique de bassin versant à une logique de territoire : le schéma d'aménagement et de gestion des eaux "Rance, Frémur et baie de Beausais". TSM: pp. 72-80.
- Laganier, R. and H.-J. Scarwell (2001). "Risque inondation, aménagement du territoire et développement durable : l'exemple du bassin versant de la Canche (Pas-de-Calais)." Cahiers lillois d'économie et de sociologie(n° 37): pp. 87-101.
- Launay, J. (2003). Rapport d'information fait au nom de la Délégation à l'aménagement et au développement durable du territoire, sur la gestion de l'eau sur le territoire. Paris, Assemblée Nationale: 92 p.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action.
- Regourd, S. (2004). La révision constitutionnelle de mars 2003 et l'unité de la République. Les Cahiers Français. Décentralisation, Etat et territoires: pp.59-66.
- Regourd, S. (2004). L'organisation territoriale issue de la décentralisation de 1982 : un bilan critique. Les Cahiers Français. Décentralisation, Etat et territoires: p.3-7.